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I. Introduction
At the age of thirty-three, Hollie Toups received a lifechanging phone call.1 While at work, the Texas teacher’s aide
answered her phone only to hear the devastating news that halfnaked images from her past could be found online.2 After rushing
home to check the website Texxxan.com, Hollie discovered several
topless photographs of herself.3 She had taken the photographs
nearly ten years earlier for an ex-boyfriend,4 and now they
flashed across her computer screen with links attached to her
social media accounts and a Google map of her location.5 Both
humiliated and afraid, Hollie refused to leave her home for days,
and when she finally ventured into town, strange men
approached her about the seminude photographs.6 Unwilling to
1. See James Fletcher, The Revenge Porn Avengers, BBC NEWS,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-25321301 (last updated Dec. 11, 2013, 2:25
PM) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (interviewing Hollie Toups and detailing her
experience as a revenge porn victim) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Women’s Outrage After Ex-Boyfriends Post Revenge Porn Photos, ABC
NEWS (Jan. 25, 2013, 8:34 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/
01/womens-outrage-after-ex-boyfriends-post-nude-photos/ (last visited Nov. 18,
2014) [hereinafter Women’s Outrage] (discussing the stories of several revenge
porn victims, including Hollie Toups’s story) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
2. See Fletcher, supra note 1 (recounting the details of the day Hollie
Toups discovered her own seminude photographs on Texxxan.com).
3. See id. (explaining that Toups left work, went directly home, and “ran
upstairs and opened [her] computer,” where she discovered topless photographs
of herself on Texxxan.com).
4. See id. (noting that the thirty-three-year-old had taken the photos for
an ex-boyfriend when she was twenty-four).
5. See id. (noting that the topless images appeared with Toups’s name,
links to her Facebook and Twitter accounts, a Google map of her location, and a
stream of user comments).
6. See id. (“She was afraid to leave the house, and when she eventually
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accept this devastating form of public humiliation, Hollie chose to
fight Texxxan.com.7 Ultimately, her legal battle would gain
national attention and bring light to the legal issues surrounding
the nonconsensual distribution of sexually explicit images of an
ex-partner,8 now commonly known as “revenge porn.”9
Hollie’s story is not unlike those of countless other revenge
porn victims.10 Because she originally captured the images for a
romantic interest, Hollie assumed her ex-boyfriend distributed
the pictures.11 Though she eventually discovered that a hacker
stole the images from her phone,12 Hollie’s first assumption
illustrates the common principle behind revenge porn. Most
images found on revenge porn websites stem from ex-partners,
jilted by their former partner and seeking revenge through public
humiliation.13 If an ex-partner stores sexually explicit
photographs from the relationship, the ex-partner may distribute
these to various revenge porn distribution websites.14 Once the
did, she was approached several times by men who had seen the photos.”).
7. See id. (noting that Hollie Toups and “dozens of other women” filed a
class action civil lawsuit against the website owners, the web-hosting company,
and even some of the original posters for invasion of privacy); Women’s Outrage,
supra note 1 (noting that Hollie Toups and other victims attempted to “reclaim
their privacy” by pursuing claims against Texxxan.com and its host server,
GoDaddy.com).
8. See Derek Bambauer, Beating Revenge Porn with Copyright, INFO/LAW
BLOG (Jan. 25, 2013), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2013/01/25/beatingrevenge-porn-with-copyright/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) [hereinafter
Bambauer, Beating Revenge Porn with Copyright] (“The lawsuit against
scumbag Web site Texxxan.com has generated attention to the problem of
revenge porn, and to the paucity of legal remedies available to victims of it.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. See infra note 45 and accompanying text (defining revenge porn).
10. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 1 (“[T]he experience of Hollie Toups and
other women is typical of victims everywhere . . . .”).
11. See, e.g., id. (noting that Toups originally suspected that her exboyfriend posted the photographs).
12. See, e.g., id. (explaining that because some of her revenge porn
photographs had never been shared with anyone, Hollie Toups believes a cell
phone repair service hacked the images).
13. See, e.g., infra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining that revenge
porn usually appears after a romantic relationship ends and one partner shares
sexually explicit images that were created during the relationship).
14. See Mary Anne Franks, Combating Non-Consensual Pornography: A
Working Paper 3 (Dec. 5, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Franks,
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images find their way to a site, either through vengeful expartners or thieving hackers, they become extremely difficult to
remove.15
Hollie Toups understood well the legal barriers surrounding
the removal of these images. After discovering her seminude
photographs online and desperately seeking a way to remove
them, Hollie reached out to local law enforcement and legal
services.16 She found little aid in the police officers and attorneys
who told her that there was nothing she could do and often
scolded her for taking the pictures.17 Finally, Hollie began
working with local private investigators who were able to shut
the site down on child pornography charges because some photos
on the site displayed women under the age of eighteen.18 With
few other legal options remaining,19 Hollie and several other
victims filed a class action invasion-of-privacy suit against the
owners of Texxxan.com and its web-hosting company,
GoDaddy.com.20

A Working Paper] (explaining that an ex-partner or hacker may upload the
sexually explicit images to a website, allowing thousands of people to view the
images) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See Lorelei Laird, Victims Are Taking on “Revenge Porn” Websites for
Posting Photos They Didn’t Consent To, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2013, 9:30 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/victims_are_taking_on_revenge_po
rn_websites_for_posting_photos_they_didnt_c/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medi
um=email&utm_campaign=tech_monthly (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (noting
that there is no clear legal avenue to penalize revenge porn posters and many
victims are turned away by law enforcement) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
16. See Fletcher, supra note 1 (explaining that many women in Toups’s
town fell victim to similar revenge porn schemes and most attempted to notify
law enforcement or find an attorney).
17. See id. (“[T]he response [from police and lawyers] was generally the
same—they were told there was nothing they could do, and they shouldn’t have
taken the photos in the first place.”).
18. See id. (explaining that some of the photos displayed women under the
age of eighteen and that the allegations of child pornography convinced
operators to shut down the site).
19. See infra Part III (discussing a victim’s available legal options).
20. See GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 753 (Tex. App. 2014)
(reciting facts of the case).
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Unfortunately, under § 230 of the Communications Decency
Act (CDA),21 website operators and their Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) generally hold far-reaching immunity from the
actions of third-party posters.22 This provision allows revenge
porn websites and their hosts to retain immunity from the actions
of the individuals who post the images so long as the website did
not create or develop the material.23 When Hollie filed the class
action suit against GoDaddy.com, the web-hosting company filed
a motion to dismiss, citing its immunity under § 230.24 The trial
court denied the dismissal, but the Court of Appeals of Texas
reversed the order: “Allowing plaintiffs’ [sic] to assert any cause
of action against GoDaddy for publishing content created by a
third party, or for refusing to remove content created by a third
party would be squarely inconsistent with section 230.”25
Despite the outcome, the publicity from the case gained the
attention of many state legislatures who have become
increasingly aware of the inadequate legal options available to
revenge porn victims.26 For example, several states, including
California, Maryland, and Wisconsin, passed anti-revenge-porn
laws that provide varying degrees of protection for victims,27 and
21. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
22. See id. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.”).
23. Id.
24. See GoDaddy.com, 429 S.W.3d at 753 (reciting procedural history of the
case).
25. Id. at 758.
26. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing
Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 357–61 (2014) (explaining a revenge
porn victim’s civil and criminal law options and legal limitations); Franks, A
Working Paper, supra note 14, at 4–7 (discussing the inadequacy of existing
civil claims and criminal law); infra Part III (discussing existing legal options in
greater detail).
27. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2013), amended by 2014 Cal.
Legis. Serv. Ch. 71 (S.B. 1304) (West) (prohibiting the recording and subsequent
nonconsensual distribution of images of intimate body parts of another
identifiable individual when the parties understand that the images are to
remain private); H.R. 43, 434th Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2014) (to be codified at MD.
CODE, CRIM. LAW § 3-809) (“A person may not knowingly disclose [an image] of
another person whose intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of
sexual contact, without the consent of the other person and with the intent to
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several other states quickly followed with their own anti-revengeporn bills.28 However, state legislation often faces serious
constitutional challenges because critics claim the free speech
rights of posters must be protected.29 Critics argue that these
state laws are overly broad and may censor merely offensive
speech and speech on matters of public concern.30 This criticism
severely limited the California law, which now requires the
victim to prove severe emotional damage.31 As other states
struggle to provide adequate legal remedies and avoid
constitutional challenges, vengeful ex-partners continue to post
illicit images, and website operators continue to receive immunity
under § 230, leaving victims with limited legal options.32
This Note explores the legal issues surrounding revenge porn
as well as the inadequate legal options available to victims;
ultimately, it argues that reform of § 230 of the CDA can provide
victims of revenge porn with a proper legal remedy.33 Part II
cause serious emotional distress.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09 (West 2014)
(prohibiting the transmission or distribution of nude or partially nude images
without the consent of the photographed individual, regardless of whether the
depicted individual consented to taking the photographs).
28. See, e.g., S. 5949, 236th Leg., 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013)
(establishing “the crime of non-consensual disclosure of sexually explicit images
as a class A misdemeanor”). This New York bill passed the state senate in June
2014 and awaits approval by the state assembly. See also H.R. 475, 116th Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2014) (prohibiting the intentional nonconsensual disclosure of a
private, sexually explicit image of an individual who is identified through
personal identifiers, links, or facial recognition for the purposes of harassment).
This Florida bill died in committee on May 2, 2014.
29. See infra Part III.D (discussing the constitutional issues involved in
state regulation of revenge porn).
30. See Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025, 2088 (2014)
[hereinafter Bambauer, Exposed] (explaining why criminal sanctions against
nonconsensual distribution of images may face First Amendment scrutiny);
Amanda Levendowski, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J.
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422, 438 (2014) (“From a First Amendment perspective,
targeted revenge porn legislation occupies a tricky space: imprecisely drafted
revenge porn legislation protects many victims but risks criminalizing protected
expression, but whittling down legislation to avoid trammeling free speech
excludes many of the victims the law intended to protect.”).
31. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (explaining that the author of the
images must intend to cause, and must cause, “serious emotional distress”).
32. See infra Part IV (discussing the § 230 limitations of state legislation).
33. See infra Part V (explaining why reform to § 230 may be the best
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explains the rising trend of revenge porn as well as its
devastating effects.34 Part III explores a victim’s existing legal
options, including copyright law, tort law, criminal law, and state
anti-revenge-porn legislation.35 Part III also explains the
inadequacies of these options, including the constitutional
limitations of state legislation.36 Part IV details the obstacle of
§ 230 immunity,37 and it further clarifies why civil suits against
revenge porn websites fail, leaving victims with little recourse.38
Part V suggests that the most powerful and effective solution lies
not in state legislation but in reform of § 230 of the CDA.39 To
reach this conclusion, it explores the recent movement away from
traditional interpretations of § 230 immunity.40 It then proposes
the addition of takedown notice requirements that would allow
victims to notify website operators of the images and request
removal.41 These provisions can limit the liability of website
operators and ISPs without chilling communication on the
Internet.42 The Note concludes by highlighting the importance of
setting an important federal standard for combating cyber
harassment.43

available option for victims of revenge porn).
34. See infra Part II (defining revenge porn and explaining the challenges
faced by victims).
35. See infra Part III (discussing existing legal options available to revenge
porn victims).
36. See infra Part III.D (explaining the limitations to state anti-revengeporn legislation).
37. See infra Part IV (explaining § 230 immunity).
38. See infra Part IV.B (explaining that traditional § 230 jurisprudence
provides broad immunity to interactive computer services).
39. See infra Part V (proposing a solution to revenge porn that requires
reform to § 230 of the CDA).
40. See infra Part IV.C (explaining case law that suggests a movement
away from traditional interpretations of § 230 immunity).
41. See infra Part V.A (comparing § 230 of the CDA to the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act and suggesting similar takedown notice procedures).
42. See infra Part V.C (explaining why takedown notice provisions in § 230
limit the immunity of ISPs without encouraging censorship).
43. See infra Part VI (discussing the implications of the proposed
amendment).
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II. Defining Revenge Porn

Revenge porn, or “involuntary pornography,” 44 involves the
distribution of nude or sexually explicit photographs or videos of
an individual without that individual’s consent. 45 These sexually
explicit images include photographs and videos taken by the
victim, as well as images taken by the poster or another.46
Though hackers sometimes obtain and distribute the images,
the photos often surface after a romantic relationship. 47 The
victim willingly provides the photos with the trust and
confidence that they remain within the boundaries of the
romantic relationship; however, once the relationship ends—
perhaps on hateful terms—the partner holding the images seeks
“revenge” by posting the material online. 48 Regardless of how
the posters acquire the images, various outlets exist for the
distribution of revenge porn. Websites such as UGotPosted, 49
44. See Laird, supra note 15 (referring to the distribution of nude or
sexually explicit photos as “revenge porn” or “involuntary pornography”).
45. See, e.g., Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and
Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224, 227 (2011)
[hereinafter Franks, Unwilling Avatars] (defining revenge porn as “a practice
where ex-boyfriends and husbands post to the web sexually explicit photographs
and videos of [women] without their consent”); Laird, supra note 15 (defining
revenge porn as “nude or sexual photos posted online without [the victim’s]
consent”); Suneal Bedi, California’s Attempt to Avenge Revenge Porn,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 8, 2013, 11:21 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/suneal-bedi/california-revenge-porn_b_3879916.html (last updated
Nov. 9, 2013, 5:12 AM) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (defining revenge porn as the
act of distributing nude or seminude photos or videos of an individual without
that individual’s consent) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
46. See MARY ANNE FRANKS, CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN: FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS (Oct. 9, 2013) [hereinafter FRANKS, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2337998 (defining revenge porn).
47. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 1 (explaining that the name “revenge
porn” implies that most of the sexually explicit images appear online as a form
of revenge after a relationship ends); Laird, supra note 15 (“Revenge porn gets
its name because many pictures are posted by former lovers who kept sexual
photos after the relationship ended. Others are reportedly acquired through
hacking, theft by repair people or false personal ads.”).
48. See Laird, supra note 15 (explaining that revenge porn often stems
from former lovers that seek revenge on their ex-partners).
49. See Dan Thompson, Man Who Ran ‘Revenge Porn’ Site Ugotposted.Com
Charged After Allegedly Extorting Tens of Thousands of Dollars From Victims,
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IsAnyoneUp.com,50 and Texxxan.com51 allow visitors to post
pornographic photographs and videos of their ex-partners and
others, advertising “payback” against the exes that jilted them.52
As revenge porn distribution websites increase in number
and popularity, revenge porn spreads more rapidly across the
Internet and around the world.53 Less than five years ago,
websites like IsAnyoneUp.com and Texxxan.com did not exist;
rather, individuals circulated sexually explicit images of their
former partners through e-mail or maybe the occasional blog.54
Early in the Internet age and before the explosion of revenge porn
distribution websites, these photos could be quickly and quietly

NAT’L POST (Dec. 11, 2013, 4:02 PM), http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/
12/11/man-who-ran-revenge-porn-site-ugotposted-com-charged-after-allegedlyextorting-tens-of-thousands-of-dollars-from-victims/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014)
(reporting the arrest of the owner of UGotPosted, a revenge porn website that
required submissions identify victims by name, age, and other identifying
information) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
50. See Lee Moran, Revenge Porn Website IsAnyoneUp.com Shut Down
After Anti-Bullying Group Buys Domain Name, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Apr. 20,
2012, 8:59 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2132672/Revenge-pornwebsite-IsAnyoneUp-com-shut-anti-bullying-group-buys-domain---new-ownerslammed-running-VERY-similar-service.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2014)
(reporting the shutdown of revenge porn website IsAnyoneUp.com) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
51. See “Revenge Porn” Website Featuring Half-Naked Photos that Is Facing
Lawsuit Gets Shut Down By Host Site, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Feb. 5, 2013, 5:11
PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2274099/Revenge-porn-websitetexxxan-com-featuring-womens-half-naked-photos-sued-gets-shut-host-site.html
(last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (reporting the shutdown of Texxxan.com) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
52. See id. (noting that sites like Texxxan.com are referred to as revenge
porn because so many of the images are shared by “jilted ex-lovers” with the
purpose of degrading the victims).
53. See Bambauer, Exposed, supra note 30, at 2034 (explaining statistics
that show a desire to share intimate photographs with a romantic partner has
increased, as has the unauthorized distribution of such images (citations
omitted)); Citron & Franks, supra note 26, at 350 (“Today, intimate photographs
are increasingly being distributed online, potentially reaching thousands, even
millions of people, with a click of a mouse.”).
54. See Laird, supra note 15 (naming two attorneys who started
representing revenge porn victims four years ago, before the creation of revenge
porn distribution sites, and noting that their clients’ photos were usually sent
through e-mail or posted on photo-sharing sites or blogs).
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contained.55 Today, however, websites like IsAnyoneUp.com and
others exist with the intent of distributing these photos and
humiliating the victims,56 and the photos are no longer removed
upon request.57 Despite these concerns, more and more
individuals share nude or suggestive photos with their partners,58
and unfortunately, more and more partners betray that
confidence and distribute those images across the Internet.59
As the popularity of revenge porn grows, so does the harm
caused by this unique form of cyber harassment. Because revenge
porn usually carries identifying information about the victim and
links to his or her social networking profile,60 the sexually explicit
55. See id. (“Before the Internet . . . compromising photos could do limited
harm because they stayed within a few people’s hands. Earlier in the Internet
era, online photo-sharing sites would take them down quickly if asked.”).
56. See id. (describing the purpose of the sites as an intent to “publicly
shame, humiliate and degrade the victim”); Jill Filipovic, “Revenge Porn” Is
About Degrading Women Sexually and Professionally, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 28,
2013, 5:23 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/28/
revenge-porn-degrades-women (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (“[The sites] aren’t
about naked girls; there are plenty of those who are on the internet
consensually. It’s about hating women, taking enjoyment in seeing them
violated, and harming them.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
57. See, e.g., Bekah Wells, An Involuntary Porn Star: My Story, WOMEN
AGAINST REVENGE PORN, http://www.womenagainstrevengeporn.com/#!AnInvoluntary-Pornstar-My-Story-/c618/6151C735-CEEF-45B2-A175AC3E61347B3A (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (recalling how Wells’s own ceaseand-desist letter was simply ignored) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). But see Part III.A (explaining that some victims may seek removal
through copyright law).
58. See Bambauer, Exposed, supra note 30, at 2034–45 (citing surveys that
reveal 53.5% of heterosexual respondents and 74.8% of lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender respondents shared a nude photo with another, while another
study reveals that nearly one-third of young adults ages twenty to twenty-six
have posted or sent nude images of themselves).
59. See id. at 2028 (“People increasingly share intimate media—nude or
sexually explicit photos or videos—with their partners. And those partners
increasingly betray that trust by sharing those media without consent.”).
60. See Laird, supra note 15 (“Involuntary porn is generally posted with the
subject’s real name, city and state, and often links to social media profiles.”). For
example, Bekah Wells discovered nude photographs of herself on a revenge porn
site after randomly Googling her own name. Wells, supra note 57. The photos
listed not only her name but also her city and occupation. Id. Similarly, the
photographs of Hollie Toups also listed her name and provided a link to her
Facebook profile. Bambauer, Exposed, supra note 30, at 2026 (citation omitted).
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images begin to appear frequently as top search results on Google
and other Internet search engines.61 In a digital age where
employers and educational institutions depend on Google
searches and social media profiles to facilitate hiring or
admissions processes,62 such search results prove truly
devastating to a victim’s professional life.63 When the images also
include contact information for the victim’s family and friends,
the harm extends into the victim’s personal life as well.64
Because the photos remain in the unforgiving realm of
cyberspace and cannot be easily removed from revenge porn
websites, the harm proves severe and long-lasting.65 Victims may
try to confine the harm by deleting their online presence, but they
isolate themselves from rewarding social connections and
personal contacts, limiting their friendships and dating
opportunities.66 Offline, the victims completely alter their lives in
61. See Laird, supra note 15 (explaining that posting the images with
identifying information “helps get the pictures high in Google search results for
the subject’s name,” which “hurts the victim’s ability to get or keep jobs, dates
and more”).
62. See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 80
(2009) (“Employers often review Google searches before interviewing and hiring
candidates.”); Citron & Franks, supra note 26, at 352 (referring to a study that
indicates nearly 80% of employers use Internet search engines to research job
applicants, rejecting about 70% of applicants based on their findings (citation
omitted)).
63. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 62, at 70–71 (explaining that because many
comments are damaging to the victim’s reputation, spread false claims about
mental illness and physical disease, and are often forwarded directly to
employers, these comments may interfere with economic opportunities); Citron
& Franks, supra note 26, at 350–54 (explaining the adverse impact of revenge
porn, including physical stress, economic repercussions, and sexual assaults).
64. See Citron & Franks, supra note 26, at 350 (“[The image] can be emailed or otherwise exhibited to the victim’s family, employees, co-workers, and
friends.”); Laird, supra note 15 (“Some postings have included information for
contacting the victim’s work supervisor or family.”).
65. See Citron & Franks, supra note 26, at 350–54 (explaining that revenge
porn produces serious harms, including offline stalking and attacks, anxiety and
depression, loss of employment, and forfeiture of online presence).
66. See Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 45, at 229 (“Women shut
down their blogs, avoid websites they formerly frequented, take down social
networking profiles, refrain from engaging in online political commentary, and
choose not to maintain potentially lucrative or personally rewarding online
presences due to cyberspace harassment.” (citation omitted)).
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an attempt to disassociate themselves from the images. They
change jobs, drop out of school, relocate to new cities, or “go into
hiding” to avoid threats of sexual abuse and stalking.67 Along
with these external stressors, coping with the anxiety,
depression, and self-blame that follows the distribution of
nonconsensual pornography proves difficult, and some victims
commit suicide.68
The harm caused by the unwanted distribution of sexually
explicit images reaches both women and men.69 However, within
this Note, many stories and statistics will reflect the effect that
revenge porn plays on the lives of female victims.70 While revenge
porn affects both sexes and all sexual orientations,71 it
disproportionately upsets the lives of heterosexual young women
as part of a larger class of cyber gender harassment victims.72
67. See id. (“The harms they experience spill over into their offline lives:
women have dropped out of school, changed jobs, moved cities, gone into hiding,
experienced mental breakdowns, and, in extreme cases, committed suicide.”
(citation omitted)); Citron, supra note 62, at 70 (explaining that by posting
identifying information online, the poster places the victim at risk of identity
theft, employment discrimination, and stalking).
68. See FRANKS, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 46 (“Victims are
routinely threatened with sexual assault, stalked, harassed, fired from jobs, and
forced to change schools. Some victims have committed suicide.”); FAQ for
Victims and Survivors, WITHOUT MY CONSENT, http://www.without
myconsent.org/faq (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (answering the question, “What
are some of the emotional reactions someone whose privacy was violated might
have?”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
69. See Citron & Franks, supra note 26, at 353 (referring to a study of
1,244 revenge porn victims, of which 90% were female (citation omitted)); Danny
Gold, The Man Who Makes Money Publishing Your Nude Pics, THE AWL (Nov.
10,
2011),
http://www.theawl.com/2011/11/the-man-who-makes-moneypublishing-your-nude-pics (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (“Unlike many co-ed sites
out there, Is Anybody Up? features just as many men as women, if not more.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
70. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 1 (detailing the story of Hollie Toups, a
revenge porn victim).
71. See Bambauer, Exposed, supra note 30, at 2027–28 (citing surveys that
report victims of revenge porn as both heterosexual and LGBT individuals);
Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 45, at 227–28 (noting that while other
groups are affected by cyber harassment, special attention should be given to
the gendered dimension of online harassment).
72. See Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 45, at 227–28 (mentioning
revenge porn within the larger context of cyber harassment).
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Most revenge porn victims are young females,73 and young
women are more frequently and severely affected by cyber
harassment.74 Unfortunately, both male and female victims find
inadequate remedies in existing legal options and continue to
suffer the harms of nonconsensual pornography with little hope of
recovery.75
III. A Revenge Porn Victim’s Existing Legal Options
As states begin to consider specific legislation to battle the
growth of nonconsensual pornography, they face criticism from
those who believe the answer lies in existing copyright, tort, and
criminal law.76 However, finding relief in existing law often
proves difficult. Law enforcement and legal services may blame
the victim or dismiss the claims as insignificant.77 When legal
options exist, they prove time-consuming and expensive, and
lengthy civil trials lead to extended publicity for an individual
already experiencing intense public humiliation.78 Additionally,
while a trial may result in injunctive relief or monetary damages,
the images usually remain online.79 The following subparts
73. See, e.g., Franks, A Working Paper, supra note 14, at 4 (indicating that
the majority of revenge porn victims are women and girls); Laird, supra note 15
(noting that revenge porn victims “skew female and young” and that all those
who have stepped forward to pursue litigation are female).
74. See, e.g., Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 45, at 227 (“Cyber
harassment affects women disproportionately, both in terms of frequency and in
terms of impact.”).
75. See infra Part III (discussing the inadequacy of existing legal options).
76. See Citron & Franks, supra note 26, at 357 (“Some commentators
oppose regulatory proposals based on the argument that existing civil remedies
can ably address revenge porn.” (citation omitted)).
77. See Levendowski, supra note 30, at 425 (noting that victims’ claims are
“often met with apathy from local police”).
78. See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 775 F.3d 398,
404 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the victim’s initial lawsuit “sparked
national media attention, which precipitated further postings”); Citron &
Franks, supra note 26, at 357–79 (explaining why existing tort law proves
problematic for victims of revenge porn).
79. See Citron & Franks, supra note 26, at 358–59 (“The removal of images
is the outcome that most victims desire above all else, and civil litigation may be
unable to make that happen.”); Levendowski, supra note 30, at 425 (explaining
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examine various areas of the law in which a victim may attempt
to find relief, as well as explain the shortcomings of each.
A. Copyright Law
Because victims seek removal of all of their images, not just
monetary damages or injunctive relief,80 scholars suggest turning
to copyright law.81 Victims own the copyright to self-authored
images, or “selfies,” regardless of their intention to share them. 82
Because more than 80% of revenge porn images are self-authored
images,83 these victims may demand removal of the sexually
explicit images under § 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA).84 Essentially, the DMCA states that a website loses
its “safe harbor” immunity when it receives actual knowledge of
infringing materials and fails to act.85 Under the Act’s takedown
that victims usually desire removal of the images, not just the injunctive relief
or monetary damages that follow civil suits).
80. See, e.g., Levendowski, supra note 30, at 425 (explaining that victims
want the images removed as quickly as possible).
81. See, e.g., id. at 439–46 (explaining why copyright law may protect the
majority of revenge porn victims without reworking existing law, abridging free
speech, or affecting § 230 immunity); Bambauer, Beating Revenge Porn with
Copyright, supra note 8 (suggesting that revenge porn victims turn to § 512 of
the DMCA and explaining possible objections to this solution).
82. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012) (“Copyright in a work protected under this
title vests initially in the author or authors of the work.”); Levendowski supra
note 30, at 443 (noting that a victim need not register the image or hire a lawyer
to file a takedown notice (citation omitted)).
83. See Levendowski, supra note 30, at 426 (referring to a survey of 864
revenge porn victims that revealed that more than 80% of revenge porn images
are self-authored images).
84. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (limiting the liability of ISPs that remove or block
infringing material upon receipt of actual knowledge or awareness).
85. See id. § 512(c)(1) (explaining that a service provider is not liable for
copyright infringement if it does not have actual knowledge or if it acts to
remove or block the material after receiving such knowledge). Courts have
interpreted “actual knowledge” to mean “knowledge of specific and identifiable
infringements” rather than general knowledge of infringing activity. See, e.g.,
Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30–32 (2d Cir. 2012) (relying on
the language and basic operation of § 512 to support its finding that the law
requires actual knowledge of infringing material). A site may also lose its safeharbor immunity if it receives financial benefits from the infringing material
because it then has the “right and ability to control such activity.” 17 U.S.C.
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notification procedure, a website may gain such “actual
knowledge” when victims of copyright infringement notify the
website.86 If the website removes the infringing image upon such
notification, it retains its DMCA immunity. This requirement
forces websites either to remove infringing material or to face
liability for the copyright infringement,87 an area of law not
covered by § 230 immunity.88 This solution provides victims of
copyright infringement with an efficient and effective way to
remove the illicit material.89
While the DMCA may aid those with self-authored images,
other revenge porn victims find copyright claims challenging and
sometimes useless. For example, victims pursuing a potential
copyright infringement claim face the serious challenge of
proving ownership of the images.90 Under the DMCA, the
claimant must certify that he or she is authorized to act on behalf
of the owner of an exclusive right and must do so under penalty of
perjury.91 If the individual captured the image, the claim
stands.92 However, for the nearly 20% of revenge porn victims
§ 512(c)(1)(B).
86. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (listing elements of notification).
87. See id. § 512(c)(1)(C) (explaining that a service provider is not liable for
copyright infringement if it receives notification and “responds expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to
be the subject of infringing activity”).
88. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2012) (noting that this law has no effect on
criminal law, intellectual property law, state law, or communications privacy
laws); Levendowski, supra note 30, at 428 (“ISPs are not required to monitor or
proactively remove user-generated content, but § 230 immunity does not extend
to violations of child pornography, obscenity, or copyright law.” (citations
omitted)).
89. See, e.g., supra Part III.A (explaining the DMCA’s ability to provide
prompt relief for some victims of revenge porn).
90. See Bambauer, Beating Revenge Porn with Copyright, supra note 8
(noting that two obstacles may exist for revenge porn victims seeking § 512
relief: not owning the image and certifying under penalty of perjury that they
are authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner).
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i) (listing a “physical or electronic signature
of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is
allegedly infringed” as an element of notification).
92. See Levendowski, supra note 30, at 339–42 (concluding that copyright
solutions may prove helpful to revenge porn victims who self-authored the
images).
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whose images were captured by their ex-partner or another,
authorship proves a nearly impossible hurdle to overcome.93 Even
when a victim proves authorship, a copyright infringement claim
may simply be ignored, leading to a costly and time-consuming
trial.94
Even revenge porn victims able to act under § 512 may
encounter obstacles. For example, copyrighted images removed
from one revenge porn website may begin appearing on other
similar sites, or users may post more sexually explicit images to
the original site in retaliation.95 For victims seeking to regain
their privacy, this additional exposure must be considered before
pursuing § 512 takedown notices.96 Additionally, takedown
notices to international ISPs may prove ineffective; the ISP may
simply refuse to comply with United States law.97 Investigations
into these servers are costly and may only attract more unwanted
publicity for victims.98 Ultimately, § 512 takedown notifications
help some revenge porn victims achieve removal but leave many
victims without this desired remedy.

93. See id. at 439–40 (explaining that copyright law provides a solution to
those with self-authored images). Some scholars propose a solution under the
theory of “joint authorship,” though this remains largely untested. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(a) (2012) (“The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the
work.”); Bambauer, Beating Revenge Porn with Copyright, supra note 8
(proposing that revenge porn victims may claim joint authorship of revenge porn
images because the victim is the subject and the subject holds expressive value
in these particular images).
94. See Citron & Franks, supra note 26, at 360 (noting that many revenge
porn websites ignore takedown notices because they know victims cannot afford
to hire an attorney).
95. See Levendowski, supra note 30, at 444 (explaining why takedown
notifications may prove problematic).
96. See id. (“By issuing a takedown notice—which requires the disclosure of
personal information—victims may inadvertently draw more attention to the
images as the website might create additional posts about victims who request
takedowns or encourage users to re-post victims’ images onto other websites.”
(citation omitted)).
97. See id. (noting that sites with servers abroad may refuse to follow the
law or ignore the takedown requests (citation omitted)).
98. See id. (“For victims who are able to afford a lawyer, filing a subpoena
seeking the disclosure of servers’ locations could potentially attract attention to
the images at issue.”).
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B. Tort Law
In 2012, a Colorado court awarded injunctive relief and
$155,000 in damages to a revenge porn victim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and public disclosure of private
facts.99 The woman’s ex-boyfriend posted sexually explicit images
of her to his blog and other websites with false statements
regarding their relationship and her marriage, and he repeatedly
e-mailed more images to both the victim and her husband.100 He
created false social media accounts and distributed the images to
third parties, who further distributed and publicized the
photographs.101 The court ultimately granted monetary damages
and injunctive relief, finding that the poster intended “to destroy
Plaintiffs’ marriage, to cause Plaintiffs’ emotional distress, to
harass them, and to stalk them.”102
Like the Colorado woman, other revenge porn victims may
pursue a civil suit for a variety of tort actions.103 For example, a
victim may file an intentional infliction of emotional distress suit
if he or she shows that the poster engaged in “extreme and
outrageous conduct” that “intentionally or recklessly cause[d]
severe emotional harm.”104 A poster—having intentionally posted
such an image to a website well-known for dealing in
degradation—intentionally, or at least recklessly, inflicts
emotional distress onto the victim.105 However, case law requires
99. See Doe v. Hofstetter, No. 11-cv-02209-DME-MJW, 2012 WL 3398316,
at *1–2 (D. Colo. Aug. 14, 2012) (ordering monetary damages and injunctive
relief).
100. See Doe v. Hofstetter, No. 11-cv-02209-DME-MJW, 2012 WL 2319052,
at *2–4 (D. Colo. June 13, 2012) (listing the defendant’s activities, which
included contacting the plaintiff, sending her photographs, and publishing false
statements about her).
101. See id. at *3 (noting that the defendant created a false Twitter account
impersonating the plaintiff and communicated to third parties).
102. Id.
103. See Levendowski, supra note 30, at 425 (noting that victims may
attempt to pursue stalking, harassment, and invasion-of-privacy suits).
104. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 46 (2012)
(“An actor who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional harm to another is subject to liability for that emotional
harm and, if the emotional harm causes bodily harm, also for the bodily harm.”).
105. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (explaining that posters
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that victims suffer a “severely disabling emotional response” or
“unendurable” distress.106 For example, a 2002 Fifth Circuit case
held that persistent sexual and physical harassment resulting in
anger, humiliation, and embarrassment failed to meet this
threshold requirement.107 Victims of revenge porn, therefore, may
struggle to prove that their own humiliation qualifies as severe
emotional harm under the law.108
A variety of privacy torts may also prove inapplicable. For
example, a victim claiming invasion of privacy109 generally must
show a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the images.110 This
proves challenging when victims voluntarily shared the
photographs with romantic partners; society often criticizes the
revenge porn victim for her cooperation in the initial distribution,
and courts may assume the victim intended extensive permission
to distribute the photos.111 However, allowing one individual to
often distribute revenge porn images in an attempt to seek “revenge” on their
ex-partners).
106. See Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 450 (5th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that the distress must be “unendurable” and victims of sexual
harassment who felt angry, embarrassed, disgusted, humiliated, horrified, and
repulsed failed to satisfy the threshold required); Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611,
616 (Md. 1977) (finding that plaintiff failed to show that “he suffered a severely
disabling emotional response to the defendant’s conduct”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 46 cmt. j (explaining that the emotional harm
suffered must be severe, such that no reasonable person would be expected to
tolerate it).
107. See Smith, 298 F.3d at 449 (noting that victims of sexual harassment
who felt angry, embarrassed, disgusted, humiliated, horrified, and repulsed
failed to satisfy the threshold required of “unendurable duress”).
108. Cf. infra Part III.D (explaining why the California anti-revenge-porn
law’s requirements of intent to harm and proof of harm may be difficult to
overcome).
109. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B–D (1965) (defining various
invasion-of-privacy torts).
110. See Levendowski, supra note 30, at 436–37 (noting that invasion-ofprivacy suits rarely prove useful for victims of revenge porn because victims
must demonstrate a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the images (quoting
Kristin M. Beasley, Up-Skirt and Other Dirt: Why Cell Phone Cameras and
Other Technologies Require a New Approach to Protecting Personal Privacy in
Public Places, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 69, 93 (2006))).
111. See Citron & Franks, supra note 26, at 348 (explaining the misguided
belief “that a woman’s consensual sharing of sexually explicit photos with a
trusted confidant should be taken as wide-ranging permission to share them

TAKING BACK THE INTERNET

2531

view your photograph in the context of a romantic relationship
does not permit that individual or others to distribute or view the
image without explicit permission.112 Unfortunately, breaking
down societal constructions of consent and victim-blaming may be
difficult for most revenge porn victims.113
Practical concerns also render the majority of civil claims
“more theoretical than real.”114 For example, many victims cannot
afford to hire an attorney or refuse to endure additional
unwanted publicity.115 On other occasions, civil suits fail because
the poster’s identity remains anonymous.116 When civil suits
prove successful, as they did for the young woman in Colorado,
monetary damages may be difficult to collect or may be
unsatisfactory when the victim seeks removal of the images. 117
Ultimately, victims find themselves abandoning these civil
remedies and turning to other areas of the law.
C. Criminal Law
With practical concerns limiting the effect of tort law, victims
should be able to turn to criminal law for protection. In theory,
criminal law provides a variety of desirable benefits. For
example, when a poster is criminally punished for an illicit post,
the legal system acknowledges the seriousness of the harm
caused by revenge porn.118 It also deters perpetrators who might
with the public” (citation omitted)).
112. See id. (explaining that consent is context-specific).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 357 (“Civil law can offer modest deterrence and remedy, but
practical concerns often render them more theoretical than real.”).
115. See id. at 358–59 (explaining that the problem with civil suits lies in
victims’ inability to hire an attorney or their reluctance to proceed under their
real names).
116. Cf. Richards, infra note 229, at 179 (explaining the problems that often
follow anonymous online posts).
117. See Citron & Franks, supra note 26, at 358 (noting that it may be
difficult for victims to recover damages and that even an award of damages “is
no assurance that websites will comply with requests to take down the images”).
118. See id. at 361–62 (“Criminal law is essential to send the clear message
to potential perpetrators that nonconsensual pornography inflicts grave privacy
and autonomy harms that have real consequences and penalties.” (citation
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dismiss the threat of a civil suit yet fear the serious and
permanent consequences of criminal conviction.119 In addition,
§ 230 limits immunity when federal criminal law applies,
allowing victims to attack the website operators.120
Unfortunately, prosecutors struggle to apply existing law to the
unique and relatively new concept of revenge porn, leaving
victims with little hope of finding redress in criminal law.121
Revenge porn distribution often involves a variety of criminal
behaviors, such as hacking, extortion, and the distribution of
child pornography.122 Unfortunately, relevant criminal law
applies in very limited circumstances.123 For example, all fifty
states impose criminal sanctions for various computer crimes,
including computer trespass and unauthorized use of a
computer.124 If a poster hacked into a victim’s computer or other
electronic device and removed photographs or videos, the victim
may have a valid claim under criminal law.125 However, the
majority of revenge porn images result from jilted ex-partners
who originally obtained the photographs and videos with consent;
these victims will find no recourse in hacking laws.126 Federal
omitted)).
119. See id. at 361 (explaining that a criminal conviction may deter some
perpetrators more than a civil suit).
120. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2012) (noting that § 230 has no effect on “any
other Federal criminal statute”).
121. See Citron & Franks, supra note 26, at 365–70 (explaining the
limitations of current criminal law).
122. See id. (noting various criminal acts that are associated with revenge
porn and explaining why existing criminal law fails to address these issues).
123. See id. (explaining why existing criminal laws fail to cover revenge
porn).
124. See Computer Crime Statutes, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecom
munications-and-information-technology/computer-hacking-and-unauthorizedaccess-laws.aspx (last updated June 27, 2014) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014)
(listing computer crime statutes for all fifty states) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
125. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c)(2) (West 2013), amended by 2014
Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 379 (A.B. 1649) (West) (prohibiting the unauthorized
taking, copying, or use of data from a computer, computer system, or computer
network).
126. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (noting that most revenge
porn results from jilted ex-partners).
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extortion laws, which extend beyond the reach of § 230 immunity,
also apply in only a limited number of revenge porn cases. 127
These laws apply when websites charge significant fees to remove
the photographs, but some sites do not charge fees and simply
refuse to remove the images; victims of these sites will find no
relief in extortion claims.128 Similarly, child pornography laws
may prove helpful, but they apply to a limited number of
victims.129 These laws aid victims in removing images, and even
shutting down websites, when the subject was under eighteen
years of age at the time the photograph was taken.130
Other criminal laws prove ineffective for nearly all revenge
porn victims. For example, state and federal cyber harassment
statutes require the perpetrator to engage in a “course of conduct”
that places the victim in reasonable fear of bodily harm or that
could reasonably be expected to cause “substantial” emotional
harm.131 Revenge porn may be reposted again and again by third
parties, resulting in serious and irreparable harm; however, the
poster only uploaded the original post.132 Because the poster only
uploads the image once, or maybe a handful of times, it is
unlikely that it amounts to a “course of conduct” necessary to

127. See, e.g., “Revenge Porn” Website Gets Calif. Man Charged with
Extortion, CBS (Dec. 11, 2013, 4:49 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/califman-charged-with-extortion-through-revenge-porn-website/ (last visited Nov.
18, 2014) (reporting the arrest of the operator of UGotPosted.com, who charged
victims $250–$350 to remove their images from his website) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
128. But see Citron & Franks, supra note 26, at 368 (noting that federal
prosecutors have expressed interest in pursuing extortion claims against
revenge porn website operators).
129. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012) (prohibiting certain acts relating to
child pornography, including possession, distribution, and receipt).
130. See Fletcher, supra note 1 (noting that Hollie Toups’s private
investigators shut down the website Texxxan.com on child pornography
charges).
131. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (requiring that the perpetrator’s behavior
place a person in reasonable fear of death or injury or cause, or attempt to
cause, “substantial emotional distress”).
132. See Levendowski, supra note 30, at 432 (“The harm caused by revenge
porn . . . is accomplished through the one-off act of uploading a sexually explicit
image.”).
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violate existing cyber harassment statutes.133 Unable to satisfy
these elements, victims find little relief in criminal law.
D. Enacted and Proposed State Legislation
Though existing law may prove ineffective to combat the
distribution of nonconsensual pornography, some states are
attempting to create specific anti-revenge-porn legislation.134
State criminal law does not affect the § 230 immunity of
interactive computer services,135 but such legislation undoubtedly
holds the potential to deter would-be posters and punish current
offenders.136 Unfortunately, states considering anti-revenge-porn
legislation face serious challenges as they struggle to achieve
these goals and still respect the constitutionally guaranteed
rights of posters.137
For example, California recently passed a law targeting the
distribution of nonconsensual pornography.138 The California law
makes it a misdemeanor to photograph or record the “intimate
body part or parts” of an identifiable individual and then
distribute those images with the intent to cause, and causing,
serious emotional distress.139 Victims are hindered, however, by
133. See id. (noting that victims will often fail to prove a “course of conduct”
because harms result from third parties’ reposting and redistribution of the
images rather than through repetitive and ongoing acts by the original poster).
134. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (listing various state antirevenge-porn legislation).
135. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2012) (noting that § 230 has no effect on
federal criminal statutes).
136. See Citron & Franks, supra note 26, at 361 (“A criminal law solution is
essential to deter judgment-proof perpetrators.”).
137. See, e.g., infra note 141 and accompanying text (noting that the
American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Frontier Foundation attacked
California’s proposed anti-revenge-porn bill).
138. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2013), amended by 2014 Cal.
Legis. Serv. Ch. 71 (S.B. 1304) (West) (prohibiting the recording and subsequent
distribution of images of intimate body parts of another identifiable individual
when the parties understand that the images are to remain private and the
individual has not consented to distribution).
139. See id.
Any person who photographs or records by any means the image of
the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable person, under
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the requirement that they prove not only “serious emotional
distress” but also the posters’ intent to cause such emotional
harm.140 This requirement developed after serious criticism from
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF).141 These organizations expressed
concern that anti-revenge-porn laws could be interpreted too
broadly and may allow states to criminalize a wide array of
speech, including distribution of photographs carrying a political
message.142 As one activist noted, “We generally don’t think that
finding more ways to put people in prison for speech is a good
thing.”143
In response to these criticisms, California narrowed the scope
of its law by adding the intent and proof of harm requirements. 144
Some argue that the law now passes constitutional muster
because it targets a type of speech that receives less First
Amendment protection.145 When speech falls into certain
circumstances where the parties agree or understand that the image
shall remain private, and the person subsequently distributes the
image taken, with the intent to cause serious emotional distress, and
the depicted person suffers serious emotional distress.
140. See id. (including the requirement that the perpetrator “subsequently
distributes the image taken, with the intent to cause serious emotional distress,
and the depicted person suffers serious emotional distress”).
141. See Anne Flaherty, Revenge Porn Victims Pursue New Laws, But ACLU
Urges Caution, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 16, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/
nation/2013/11/16/revenge-porn-victims-press-for-new-laws/cXQNeLzOcy7o
SDTUh3W5fK/story.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (explaining that members
of the ACLU and EFF believe these laws risk becoming an overly broad
criminalization of speech) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
142. See id. (“The [Maryland] bill would exclude images deemed to have
‘public importance’—an exemption carved out in response to critics who say
such laws would criminalize the publishing of explicit photos by journalists.”).
143. Id.
144. See id. (noting that the ACLU’s California office worked to dilute the
California anti-revenge-porn law).
145. See, e.g., Citron & Franks, supra note 26, at 374–86 (addressing the
First Amendment concerns associated with anti-revenge-porn legislation); id. at
387 (providing recommendations for future state legislation and suggesting
similar intent requirements to avoid over-breadth issues). Courts have not yet
ruled on the constitutionality of anti-revenge-porn legislation, and some
scholars suggest that it will prove unconstitutional. See, e.g., Bambauer,
Exposed, supra note 30, at 54–55 (arguing that revenge porn is not “an
unprotected expression that the government may regulate at will”).
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categories such as obscenity, child pornography, or true threats,
it proves unworthy of full First Amendment protections because
it is not an “essential part of any exposition of ideas and [is] of
such slight social value that any benefit that may be derived from
[it is] clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.”146 Harmful revenge porn images may therefore be
regulated.147 However, newsworthy images or those distributed as
matters of public concern retain their First Amendment
protection because they are distributed with the intent to inform
the public rather than harm an individual,148 and such public
issues should be freely disseminated.149 Unfortunately, these
restraints significantly narrow the protection available to revenge
porn victims, who must now prove intent to cause emotional
distress and actual emotional harm.150
Other states attempting to provide relief to revenge porn
victims are hindered by these same constitutional concerns. For
example, Florida, which abandoned an anti-revenge-porn law in
2013 due to free speech concerns,151 attempted to make it a felony
146. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (quoting Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985) (“We have long recognized
that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance.”).
147. See Citron & Franks, supra note 26, at 384–85 (agreeing with scholar
Eugene Volokh that nonconsensual pornography falls within the unprotected
category of obscenity).
148. Cf. id. at 388 (recommending exemptions for newsworthy publications
in an effort to avoid First Amendment concerns).
149. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)
(requiring public officials to prove “actual malice” for defamatory statements). In
Sullivan, the Court noted, “[W]e consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials.” Id. at 270.
150. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, California’s New Law Shows It’s Not Easy to
Regulate Revenge Porn, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2013, 12:03 PM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/10/08/californias-new-law-shows-its-not-easyto-regulate-revenge-porn/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (explaining why
“insufficient intent to cause emotional distress” may bar some victims’ claims)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
151. See H.R. 787, 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013) (prohibiting the knowing use
of a computer or other similar device to transmit or post nude images of another
without first obtaining consent from the photographed individual); Heather
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to disclose sexually explicit images of a person with identifying
information, without that person’s consent.152 However, not
unlike California’s law, the Florida law required intent to harass,
and it died in committee in May 2014.153 Maryland’s antirevenge-porn law, passed in March 2014, similarly requires
intent to cause “serious emotional distress.”154 Conversely,
Wisconsin’s anti-revenge-porn law does not include an intent
requirement.155 The Wisconsin legislature did, however, indicate
an attempt to avoid First Amendment concerns when it added a
provision
regarding
the
distribution
of
newsworthy
publications.156 By providing an exception for material that is
“newsworthy or of public importance,” Wisconsin attempts to
provide an affirmative defense to those postings distributed for
their informative value and not for harm.157 With the passage of
these laws—constrained by the Constitution and limited by
intent requirements—it becomes clear that even specific antirevenge-porn legislation fails to provide adequate protections for
victims.
Kelly, New California “Revenge Porn” Law May Miss Some Victims, CNN (Oct.
3, 2013, 6:32 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/03/tech/web/revenge-porn-lawcalifornia/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (“Florida was considering a revenge porn
law but scrapped it following First Amendment concerns.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
152. See H.R. 475, 116th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014) (prohibiting the intentional
nonconsensual disclosure of a sexually explicit image of an identifiable
individual for the purposes of harassment).
153. See id. (prohibiting the disclosure of “a sexually explicit image of an
identifiable person with the intent to harass such person”).
154. See H.R. 43, 434th Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2014) (to be codified at MD.
CODE, CRIM. LAW § 3-809) (“A person may not knowingly disclose [an image] of
another person whose intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of
sexual contact, without the consent of the other person and with the intent to
cause serious emotional distress.”).
155. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09 (West 2014) (prohibiting the distribution
of sexually explicit images without the consent of the photographed individual,
but failing to include an intent requirement).
156. See id. § 942.09(3)(b)(3) (explaining that this law does not apply to “a
person who posts or publishes a private representation that is newsworthy or of
public importance”).
157. Cf. Citron & Franks, supra note 26, at 388 (recommending future
legislation include clear exemptions for matters of public importance to avoid
over-breadth).
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IV. The Challenge of Combating Revenge Porn: § 230 Immunity
Considering the limited legal options available to revenge
porn victims, it may seem logical to pursue the website operator,
rather than the poster, to provide victims with a way to remove
the harmful images. Unfortunately, § 230 of the CDA158 provides
broad civil immunity for website operators and ISPs, preventing
such suits.159 This Part explains the law,160 as well as the
development of traditional § 230 jurisprudence, which interprets
§ 230 immunity in broad terms.161 It also explores emerging case
law that attempts to limit this immunity.162
A. The Communications Decency Act
The CDA was passed on February 1, 1996, as an amendment
to the Telecommunications Act of 1996.163 Section 230 states, “No
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.”164 An interactive
computer service includes “any information service, system, or
access software that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server.”165 This definition embraces
any website or online service, such as a website’s web-hosting

158. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
159. See id. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.”).
160. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the development of § 230).
161. See infra Part IV.B (discussing traditional interpretations of § 230
immunity).
162. See infra Part IV.C (explaining recent cases that move away from
traditional interpretations of § 230 immunity).
163. See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act: A Survey of the Legal Literature and Reform Proposals 4 (Fordham
Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2046230, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2046230 (explaining the
legislative history of the CDA).
164. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
165. See id. § 230(f)(2) (defining “interactive computer service”).
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company.166 These websites and online services retain civil
immunity so long as they do not become “information content
providers,” or “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole
or in part, for the creation or development of information
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer
service.”167 Essentially, the services cannot create or develop the
unlawful material; however, failing to remove or edit the material
after notice or revising such material often fails to qualify the ISP
as an “information content provider.”168 Instead, the original
content provider, or poster, of the information remains solely
liable because that individual is responsible, in whole or part, for
creating the material.169
While the CDA grew out of concern for pornography on the
Internet,170 § 230 addressed confusion and concerns within the
Internet industry.171 Under the common-law approach, ISPs that
used editorial control and judgment to regulate defamatory
postings were subject to higher levels of liability than ISPs that
166. See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 910 F. Supp. 2d 314, 318 (D.D.C.
2012) (explaining that Facebook, a social media website, provided and enabled
access to a computer server to multiple users, and therefore qualified as a an
interactive computer service); Reidenberg, supra note 163, at 1 (defining the
term “interactive computer service” and noting that it has “been broadly
interpreted to include any website or online service”). Even Internet providers
like Comcast have been labeled “interactive computer services” and therefore
qualify for § 230 immunity. See, e.g., e360Insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F.
Supp. 2d 605, 609–10 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (providing § 230 immunity to Comcast for
its “good Samaritan” blocking and filtering of solicitous e-mails).
167. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (defining “information content provider”).
168. See infra Part IV.B (explaining traditional interpretations of § 230
immunity). But see infra Part IV.C (describing a movement away from
traditional interpretations of § 230 immunity that imposes liability for certain
levels of editorial control).
169. See, e.g., Sarah Duran, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Spread No Evil:
Creating a Unified Legislative Approach to Internet Service Provider Immunity,
12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 115, 119–20 (2004) (“[The CDA] states that a
provider or user of an interactive computer service cannot be treated as a
publisher or speaker of information when someone else is providing the speech;
the liability goes solely to the content provider . . . .”).
170. See Reidenberg, supra note 163, at 6 (noting that original drafts of the
CDA were created with “the primary goal of protecting children from
pornography on the Internet”).
171. See id. at 4–6 (explaining the common-law approach to ISP immunity
before § 230 and the concern it caused among the computer services industry).
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followed a more “hands-off” approach and simply failed to remove
defamatory material after notification.172 This unfair standard
essentially punished self-regulating ISPs, while rewarding
“hands-off” ISPs with lower levels of liability.173 To resolve this
issue, Congress created § 230.174 This provision provides civil
immunity for ISPs and operators from the actions of third-party
posters, even when the ISP or operator uses editorial control over
the illicit material.175
B. Traditional Interpretations of § 230 Immunity
Since the enactment of § 230 in 1996, many courts have
interpreted the provision to provide a broad level of immunity to
interactive computer services.176 In 1997, only one year after the
172. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995
WL 323710, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (holding the defendant computer
service to the higher standard of “publisher liability” because it screened and
removed messages on its site); Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp.
135, 139–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying “distributor liability” to the defendant
computer network but finding that the defendant did not have knowledge of the
allegedly defamatory statements on its sites and could not be held liable for
those statements); Reidenberg, supra note 163, at 4–6 (explaining the commonlaw approach of applying “distributor liability” for failure to remove after
obtaining knowledge and “publisher liability” for repeatedly republishing the
material).
173. See Reidenberg, supra note 163, at 5–6 (explaining that the two
standards of liability led members of the computer services industry to believe
that ISPs would be discouraged from screening content because it would expose
them to excessive liability).
174. See id. (“The irreconcilability of a higher standard of liability for
publisher-ISPs that attempted to monitor for offensive content compared to
distributor-ISPs, those who ‘let anything go,’ prompted legislative reform.”).
175. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012) (“No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.”); id. § 230(c)(2)(A)
(explaining that computer services will not be held liable for “actions taken in
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected”).
176. See, e.g., Chi. Lawyer’s Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669–72 (7th Cir. 2008) (refusing to limit the § 230
immunity of the defendant website when third-party postings on the site
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CDA’s enactment, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit addressed the issue in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.177 In
Zeran, an anonymous AOL user posted advertisements to the
website’s bulletin boards, promoting the sale of shirts with
offensive slogans relating to the Oklahoma City federal building
bombing of 1995.178 The user listed Kenneth Zeran’s home
telephone number and directed interested users to contact him
for purchase information.179 Zeran then received numerous phone
calls, including “angry and derogatory” messages and death
threats.180 Though Zeran notified AOL and received assurances of
removal, the anonymous postings continued, and Zeran finally
sued the website.181 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit found that
AOL held § 230 immunity despite its notice of the illicit material
and its subsequent failure to act.182 In its decision, the court
noted that § 230 provided immunity from both the republishing of
illicit material and the failure to remove illicit material after
notification.183
violated the Fair Housing Act); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d
1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (providing broad immunity to a matchmaking website
that generated user profiles based on user answers to a questionnaire created by
the website); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–34 (4th Cir. 1997)
(refusing to limit the immunity of the defendant website even though it received
notice of the offending material and substantially delayed removal of the
material); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51–53 (D.D.C. 1998)
(allowing AOL to retain its § 230 immunity despite defamatory statements
made in an online gossip column, the author of which had a licensing agreement
with AOL allowing it to remove and edit stories).
177. See 129 F.3d 327, 330–34 (4th Cir. 1997) (allowing defendant website to
retain immunity despite notice and delayed removal of offending material).
178. See id. at 329 (explaining the facts behind the plaintiff’s action against
America Online, Inc.).
179. See id. (explaining the facts behind the plaintiff’s allegations).
180. See id. (noting that the plaintiff received “a high volume of calls,
comprised primarily of angry and derogatory messages, but also including death
threats”). As the postings continued, Zeran received an “abusive” phone call
roughly every two minutes. Id.
181. See id. (noting that the plaintiff contacted AOL repeatedly, but the
anonymous user continued to post additional advertisements).
182. See id. at 332 (explaining that AOL is “clearly protected” by § 230
immunity).
183. See id. at 331–33 (explaining why § 230 should be read to include both
distributor liability and publisher liability).
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In reaching this decision, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on
Congress’s policy goals in enacting § 230.184 As the court
explained, Congress believed that tort-based lawsuits might
threaten free speech in “the new and burgeoning Internet
medium.”185 Such tort-based liability would be “simply another
form of intrusive government regulation of speech,” and Congress
wished instead to maintain the “robust nature of Internet
communication.”186 Essentially, Congress understood that
interactive computer services might limit online speech if forced
to continuously screen millions of postings for tortious
material.187 By creating § 230, Congress aimed to remove any
such disincentives to self-regulation.188 Specifically, interactive
computer services may use editorial control to regulate offensive
material and still retain their § 230 immunity.189 In theory, this
allows these online services to self-police and remove offensive
material without fear of civil liability.190
Some scholars consider Zeran to be the “most significant
decision interpreting § 230,”191 and many courts follow its broad
interpretation of § 230 immunity.192 For example, in Carafano v.
184. See id. at 330–31 (explaining the policy behind § 230).
185. See id. at 330 (“Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits
pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.”).
186. See id. (explaining that Congress enacted § 230 to protect
communication on the Internet).
187. See id. at 331 (“Faced with potential liability for each message
republished by their services, interactive computer service providers might
choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages posted.”); id.
(“Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and chose to
immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.”).
188. See id. (noting that an important purpose of § 230 was “to encourage
service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material” and
explaining that Congress enacted § 230 “to remove the disincentives to selfregulation”).
189. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2012) (noting that interactive computer
services may not be held liable for good-faith efforts to control access to offensive
material).
190. But see infra Part V.C (discussing § 230’s failure to incentivize selfregulation).
191. See Reidenberg, supra note 163, at 10 (“Zeran v. American Online, Inc.
is by far the most significant decision interpreting Section 230.”).
192. See, e.g., Chi. Lawyer’s Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669–72 (7th Cir. 2008) (refusing to hold the
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Metrosplash.com,193 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit provided broad immunity to a matchmaking website that
created a false and defamatory profile of a well-known actress.194
The information for the profile stemmed from a questionnaire
created by the website and answered by an unknown
prankster.195 The sexually explicit language of the questionnaire
answers caused the actress to receive numerous calls, voicemails,
and e-mails from various men.196 The actress’s manager notified
the website but found that only the poster held permission to
remove the profile; however, it was eventually blocked and
deleted by the website.197 The Ninth Circuit found that the
matchmaking site retained immunity despite its involvement in
creating the profile because the harmful information came from
the actual poster.198 Like the Fourth Circuit in Zeran, the Ninth
Circuit also relied on Congress’s policy rationale.199 With such
heavy weight given to these policy goals, the traditional view of
§ 230 immunity provides broad levels of protection to interactive
computer services and severely limits revenge porn victims’
ability to gain redress from offending websites.

defendant website liable for the notices posted by users); Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (providing broad
immunity to a matchmaking website that created a questionnaire to facilitate
profile creations); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51–53 (D.D.C. 1998)
(allowing AOL to retain its § 230 immunity despite its licensing contract that
allowed it to remove and edit stories in which defamatory statements were
made).
193. 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
194. See id. at 1125 (concluding that Congress intended websites like the
defendant matchmaking site to be afforded immunity from such suits and
therefore ruling for the defendant site).
195. See id. at 1121 (reciting the facts of the case).
196. See id. at 1121–22 (explaining that the plaintiff received numerous
sexually explicit calls and messages as a result of the profile).
197. See id. at 1122 (explaining the eventual deletion of the profile).
198. See id. at 1125 (“Matchmaker did not play a significant role in creating,
developing, or ‘transforming’ the relevant information.”).
199. See id. at 1123–24 (relying on Zeran’s interpretations of Congress’s
policy goals).
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C. The Movement Away from Broad Interpretations of § 230
Immunity
Despite the traditional view of the CDA, emerging case law
supports a movement away from broad interpretations of § 230
immunity.200 Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com201 was the first case to depart substantially from
the broad interpretations of immunity provided by cases such as
Zeran and Carafano.202 In Roommates, website operators created
and used a questionnaire to match roommates and required users
to answer questions regarding gender, sexual orientation, and
family status.203 The Ninth Circuit found that the website, by
creating the offensive material within the questionnaire, became
a “developer” of the information, rather than a “passive
transmitter.”204 In shifting from traditional applications of § 230,
the Ninth Circuit explained that the CDA “was not meant to
create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”205
This movement away from broad immunity is significant,
especially considering the Ninth Circuit’s ruling five years earlier
in Carafano.206 Instead of relying heavily on Congress’s stated
policy goals, Roommates seemed to recognize that some of
200. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,
521 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that a roommate-matching website
became too involved in the illicit conduct when it created and distributed the
questionnaire that led to discrimination); Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t
Recordings, LLC, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1012 (E.D. Ky. 2012) (finding a website
liable for the postings of third parties when the website encouraged the
defamatory postings).
201. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
202. See Reidenberg, supra note 163, at 15 (noting that Roommates was the
“first major departure” from traditional broad readings of § 230 immunity).
203. See Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1161–62 (explaining the Roommates.com
profile application process).
204. See id. at 1166 (“By requiring subscribers to provide the information as
a condition of accessing its service, and by providing a limited set of prepopulated answers, Roommate becomes much more than a passive transmitter
of information provided by others; it becomes the developer, at least in part, of
that information.”).
205. Id. at 1164.
206. See supra Part IV.B (explaining traditional interpretations of § 230
immunity, including Carafano).
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Congress’s rationales may be outdated.207 For example, Congress
created § 230 because it “recognized the threat that tort-based
lawsuits pose[d] to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning
Internet medium.”208 Essentially, Congress aimed to protect the
“free market” of the Internet and thereby allow it to flourish.209 In
1997, roughly one year after Congress enacted the CDA, about
22.1% of American adults used the Internet210 and only 18%
accessed the Internet at home.211 Only fifteen years later, in 2012,
74.7% of Americans used the Internet.212 As the Internet grows
stronger, it also grows more pervasive, with 74.8% of Americans
accessing the Internet in their homes in 2012.213 Revenge porn
distribution websites profit from this growing medium, making
thousands of dollars each month from advertisements or
payments for removal of the images.214 Recognizing this trend,
Roommates may be correct in challenging Congress’s protection of
interactive computer services and instead imposing protections
for Internet users.

207. See, e.g., Duran, supra note 169, at 124 (“Although the rationale behind
the Act may have made sense when it was passed in 1996, those reasons are no
longer convincing.”).
208. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)
(explaining Congress’s policy goals in creating § 230).
209. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2012) (explaining that one policy goal of
Congress is “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation”).
210. See Duran, supra note 169, at 124 (referring to U.S. Census reports to
indicate the rising trend in Internet use (citation omitted)).
211. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET TRENDS IN AMERICA:
COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE 1984–2012, 1 (2014) [hereinafter COMPUTER AND
INTERNET
USE
1984–2012],
http://www.census.gov/hhes/computer/files/
2012/Computer_Use_Infographic_FINAL.pdf.
212. Reported Internet Usage for Individuals 3 Years and Older, By Selected
Characteristics:
2012,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
(2014),
http://www.
census.gov/hhes/computer/publications/2012.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
213. See COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE 1984–2012, supra note 211, at 1
(citing recent changes in “America’s relationship with computers”).
214. See Laird, supra note 15 (noting that Hunter Moore claimed to make
$30,000 each month from IsAnyoneUp.com and explaining that many more sites
profit today from the industry).
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Other courts have similarly challenged traditional
interpretations of § 230, but with varying degrees of success.
Most recently, in Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings,
LLC,215 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky ruled that § 230 immunity may be forfeited if the
website encourages the posting of unlawful materials.216 In Jones,
the defendant website invited users to post images and comment
about the photographed individuals.217 This led to a string of
photographs and comments about a Cincinnati Bengals
cheerleader, who eventually sued for defamation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.218 The district court held that, by
inviting libelous postings that invaded the privacy rights of the
plaintiff, the site became a developer and therefore lost its § 230
immunity.219 The defendants appealed the decision, and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.220 The Sixth
Circuit found that inviting comments and selecting posts for
publication failed to transform the website into a developer of
harmful material.221
While the district court’s decision in Jones initially suggested
a movement away from broad § 230 immunity, the Sixth Circuit’s
decision turns back to limitless immunity and highlights an
important point: not all courts are willing to abandon traditional
interpretations of § 230.222 For example, in Chicago Lawyer’s
Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law v. Craigslist,223 the
215. 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Ky. 2012).
216. See id. at 1011 (explaining that an ISP becomes responsible for the
development of material when it “encourages the development of what is
offensive about the content” (quoting Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley
v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1199 (9th Cir. 2008)).
217. See id. at 1009–10 (reciting the facts of the case).
218. Id.
219. See id. at 1012 (applying Roommates to hold the defendant website
liable).
220. Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 775 F.3d 398 (6th Cir.
2014).
221. See id. at 415–17 (explaining why the website failed to qualify as a
developer of information under traditional interpretations of § 230 immunity).
222. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (noting several courts that
followed the broad interpretation of § 230 immunity).
223. 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
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popular website Craigslist found itself publishing housing
advertisements that violated the Fair Housing Act.224 Craigslist
retained immunity because third-party posters, rather than the
website operators, created the ads.225 While the Seventh Circuit
noted that § 230 fails to provide a “general prohibition of civil
liability,” it allows broad civil immunity to websites unless they
create or develop the information.226 Supporting Congress’s policy
rationale, the Seventh Circuit explained that screening massive
amounts of online data for unlawful material would be costly,
difficult, and sometimes ineffective.227
Despite the shift demonstrated by Roommates and despite
the district court’s interpretations of § 230 in Jones, most
courts—like the Sixth and Seventh Circuits—continue to rely on
Congress’s goals of incentivizing self-regulation and protecting
the free market of the Internet. Unfortunately, revenge porn and
other forms of online abuses continue to spread more rapidly
across the Internet, and these victims cannot wait for a more
substantial change in § 230 jurisprudence. Instead, legislative
action is necessary to reform § 230 and provide relief for victims
of nonconsensual pornography and other forms of online
harassment.

224. Id. at 668 (reciting the facts of the case); see also Fair Housing Act, 46
U.S.C. § 3604 (2012).
225. See Chicago Lawyer’s Committee, 519 F.3d at 672 (“[G]iven §230(c)(1)
[the plaintiff] cannot sue the messenger just because the message reveals a
third-party’s plan to engage in unlawful discrimination.”).
226. See id. at 669 (looking to past Seventh Circuit rulings to explain that
“§ 230(c) as a whole cannot be understood as a general prohibition of civil
liability for web-site operators and other online content hosts”).
227. See id. at 668–69 (explaining the difficulty in screening massive
amounts of material). Craigslist continues its policy of relying on customer
notification instead of pre-screening postings; however, the website added a
disclaimer explaining that “[w]hen making any posting on craigslist, [posters]
must comply with section 3604(c) of the Federal Fair Housing Act.” Fair
Housing Act Information, CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.org/about/FHA (last
visited Nov. 18, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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V. Proposal to Reform § 230 of the Communications Decency Act
To provide relief for victims of nonconsensual pornography,
this Note proposes an amendment to § 230 to limit civil immunity
of interactive computer services by requiring action upon
notification of tortious activity.228 Legal scholars encourage
similar limitations to § 230 immunity in the context of
cyberbullying or to create a more unified approach to ISP
liability.229 Such limitations are not unprecedented, as evidenced
by § 512 of the DMCA.230 Section 512’s “safe harbor” immunity
allows a victim to demand removal of a self-authored image and
imposes liability on those ISPs who refuse to remove the
copyrighted image.231 For those victims whose images are not
self-authored, this means of removal does not exist because the
current CDA provides expansive immunity from the actions of
third parties. These websites, therefore, remain free from civil
liability despite notification of harmful materials and refusal to
remove those images.232 To resolve this conflict and provide an
adequate remedy for victims, Congress should similarly limit the
immunity of ISPs under the CDA by adding takedown
notification procedures.

228. See infra Part V.A (detailing the proposed amendment).
229. See, e.g., Bradley A. Areheart, Regulating Cyberbullies Through NoticeBased Liability, 41 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 41, 41 (2007) (explaining why the
government should implement takedown procedures “to curtail ISP immunity
for certain forms of tortious cyberbullying”); Duran, supra note 169, at 133–35
(encouraging Congress to adopt a unified approach to regulating ISP liability).
Other scholars simply urge that the § 230 is “ripe for reform.” See, e.g., Robert
D. Richards, Sex, Lies, and the Internet: Balancing First Amendment Interests,
Reputational Harm, and Privacy in the Age of Blogs and Social Networking, 8
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 176, 190–97 (2009) (explaining recent developments in
§ 230 jurisprudence that may indicate future changes to the CDA).
230. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2012) (requiring removal or disabling of
infringing material upon notification).
231. Id. § 512(c).
232. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997)
(finding that defendant computer service retained § 230 immunity despite
notification of harmful material and failure to remove or block the material).
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A. Proposed Amendment to Limit § 230 Immunity
To create an effective and efficient takedown notification
procedure, Congress should look to the DMCA’s procedures and
attempt to create a similar amendment within the CDA.
However, while the DMCA allows for removal upon notification
and provides a foundation for this proposal, the amendment
should not parallel the DMCA in every sense. For example,
§ 512(c)(1) of the DMCA holds ISPs liable once they receive actual
knowledge of infringing material and fail to respond in
accordance with the act.233 However, requiring action upon any
knowledge—even knowledge obtained through self-policing—of
tortious activity may discourage self-regulation, a stated policy
goal of § 230.234 To avoid this issue, the amendment should only
require action upon notification.
To do so, the amendment may state that the interactive
computer service shall not be liable for tortious activity of thirdparty users if the computer service, upon obtaining notification,
“acts expeditiously to remove or disable the material.”235 Similar
to the DMCA, the amendment should require written
notification.236 Elements of notification should include, in no
particular order: (1) identification of the actionable material
“reasonably sufficient” to allow the computer service to locate the
material;237 (2) information “reasonably sufficient” to allow the
233. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (explaining that a service provider escapes
liability if it removes or blocks the infringing material upon receipt of actual
knowledge or awareness).
234. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (“Another important purpose of § 230 was to
encourage service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive
material over their services.”).
235. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (explaining that the service retains liability
under the DMCA if “upon notification of claimed infringement . . . , [it] responds
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity”).
236. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A) (“To be effective under this subsection, a
notification of claimed infringement must be a written communication provided
to the designated agent of a service provider . . . .”).
237. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) (listing one element of notification under the
DMCA as “identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing . . . and
information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the
material”).
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computer service to contact the complainant, such as an address,
telephone number, or e-mail address;238 (3) a claim that the listed
materials give rise to legal action, such as defamation, invasion of
privacy, or a similar civil claim; (4) a statement that the
complainant has a good-faith belief that “the use of the material
in the manner complained of” gives rise to legal action as
described in the claim;239 and (5) a physical or electronic
signature of the complainant.240
Because this procedure should provide a simple and efficient
means of notification, it may be necessary to create online forms
that allow complainants to “check the box” and describe their
legal claim. For example, a victim of nonconsensual pornography
may not know the various elements of “invasion of privacy,” but
could check off a list of each of these elements on an online form.
Adequate room should be provided for the victim to describe any
elements in further detail, or to address a claim not listed in one
of the provided forms. To address the possibility of
misrepresentation, a clause may be added that imposes liability
on any individual who “knowingly materially misrepresents” that
material is actionable.241
To submit this information, a complainant should be able to
turn to the “designated agent” of the computer service.242 Under
the DMCA, computer services must designate an agent to receive
incoming notifications of copyright infringement; the DMCA’s
limitations to liability apply only to services with designated
238. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iv) (explaining that a complainant must provide
“[i]nformation reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the
complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an
electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted”).
239. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (listing as an element of notification under the
DMCA, a “statement that the complaining party has a good-faith belief that use
of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright
owner, its agent, or the law”).
240. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i) (requiring a “physical or electronic signature of
a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is
allegedly infringed”).
241. See id. § 512(f) (imposing liability on “any person who knowingly
materially misrepresents under this section” that material is infringing or was
removed due to mistake or misidentification).
242. See id. § 512(c)(2) (requiring that service providers receive notification
through “designated agents”).
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agents.243 In compliance with the act, the computer services
display the contact information for the agent on their website in
an accessible location.244 Similarly, this amendment would
require website operators to designate an official agent to receive
notifications of civil claims. These agents should be qualified to
address the legal claims within the notifications. Because most
interactive computer services already have “designated agents”
for notification submission, it imposes little hardship to allow
submission of additional notifications through those agents or a
similar process.
B. Possible Responses to Notification
Upon receipt of notification, a website operator or ISP retains
immunity if it follows the procedures set forth in the amendment,
but it may lose immunity for failing to promptly address the
issue. The legislature may set forth a period of time, such as
fifteen days, to allow the service to respond. If a service refuses to
respond within the time period and loses its § 230 immunity, the
victim may sue the service for the civil claim as though it were
the original poster. Though this causes the victim to endure a
lengthy and expensive trial, it provides an opportunity for victims
to pursue their legal claims against an identifiable defendant who
cannot hide behind the shield of § 230 immunity.
Ideally, the ISP or website operator would remove the images
within the stated time period, providing the victim with his or her
desired relief. To do so, the service must first take reasonable
steps to contact the poster and allow that individual to remove
the image or gain that individual’s permission to remove the
image. Understanding the legal consequences of revenge porn
postings may incentivize some posters to provide this permission.
This allows the interactive computer services to avoid evaluation
243. See id. (“The limitations on liability established in this subsection apply
to a service provider only if the service provider has designated an agent to
receive notifications of claimed infringement . . . .”).
244. See id. (requiring the designated agent’s contact information, including
name, address, phone number, e-mail address, and other contact information, to
be available through the service).
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of the legal claim made by the complainant. Avoiding evaluation
of the legal claim and providing removal through the poster saves
time and may allow removal of more images.
However, attempts to contact the poster may fail due to
anonymous postings or the service’s inadequate records, or the
service may fail to obtain permission for removal. At this point,
the service’s designated agent would evaluate the legal claim. If
the service finds that the claim is colorable, it removes the
unlawful material and retains § 230 immunity. However, if the
service makes a good-faith determination that the material is not
actionable, it must notify the complainant and explain its
decision. Unfortunately, some service providers may attempt to
abuse this good-faith standard. To protect victims against this
particular abuse, the amendment should allow victims to file for
injunctive relief at this stage. If a court validates the victim’s
claim, the victim should be awarded injunctive relief, either in
the form of removal or disabling of access to the material;
however, the victim would not be able to file a civil suit for
damages against the operator.
C. Effectiveness of the Proposed Amendment
This amendment provides a proper remedy for those victims
of nonconsensual pornography who cannot find relief under the
DMCA or civil and criminal laws that require action against the
poster.245 Though those laws may provide monetary relief or deter
future crimes, this amendment provides the remedy that victims
actually desire: removal of the harmful images.246 When the
images are removed, they no longer provide access to the victim’s
social media accounts or home address, and they no longer
appear in Google searches or interfere with the victim’s
employment prospects.247 This allows the victim to finally move
past the harmful online and offline harassment that follows the
245. See supra Part III (discussing the limitations of existing legal options).
246. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining that victims
desire removal more than monetary relief).
247. See supra Part II (explaining the economic harms caused by revenge
porn).

TAKING BACK THE INTERNET

2553

distribution of these sexually explicit images.248 Similar to
victims pursuing removal of copyrighted images through the
DMCA, revenge porn victims may face time-consuming and
expensive lawsuits when computer services refuse to act;249
however, these victims could ultimately find legal recourse in this
amendment, either through removal or civil action.
In providing such relief, Congress must address certain
constitutional concerns. The DMCA’s takedown procedures face
few constitutional challenges because copyright infringement
finds little protection in the First Amendment;250 however,
takedown procedures within the CDA may attract criticism. Some
scholars may argue that speech, especially anonymous speech, on
the Internet promotes the dissemination of ideas within a
growing public forum.251 The First Amendment rights of posters,
therefore, must be considered when developing responses to
nonconsensual pornography. However, in cases of revenge porn
and cyber harassment, the rights of the victims must be
acknowledged and balanced against the competing First
Amendment concerns of posters.252 When a speaker uses the
Internet not for purposes of debate and democratic discourse, or
even to spread opinion, but for the purpose of intentionally
harassing and harming another individual, courts and the
legislature must take notice.253 Legislatures willingly provide
protection for privacy interests in other settings,254 and Congress
248. See supra Part II (explaining the harms that stem from the distribution
of nonconsensual pornography).
249. See supra Part III.A (explaining the limitations of DMCA liability).
250. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 144 (1992)
(explaining that copyright law requires protection of the copyright interests of
the author in order to best protect the free expression of ideas).
251. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 229, at 197–99 (explaining courts’
protection of anonymous speech on the Internet).
252. Cf. id. at 201–04 (noting that courts have created “balancing tests”
when a victim of online defamation seeks disclosure of an anonymous poster’s
identity). These approaches require a balancing of the poster’s First Amendment
right of anonymous free speech and the prima facie case presented by the
victim, as well as the necessity for disclosure. Id.
253. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (explaining that certain
speech is less deserving of First Amendment protection).
254. See supra Part III.B (discussing various torts, including
misappropriation and invasion of privacy). For example, when criminalizing
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must now recognize those interests in the new and unique
context of revenge porn and cyber harassment.
Congress should also recognize that this amendment actually
furthers its policy goal of protecting speech on the Internet. For
example, Congress felt that civil liability would impose such a
heavy burden on interactive computer services—who would need
to screen millions of posts for tortious activity—that the services
might limit the number and type of postings allowed on their
sites. This amendment avoids such an “intrusive government
regulation of speech” because the ISP or website operator only
faces liability after notification. The victim holds an affirmative
duty to notify the computer service; therefore, the service will not
be forced to regulate millions of user accounts to track down
tortious activity, nor will it be forced to limit speech on its site.
In Zeran, the Fourth Circuit expressed concern with liability
upon notification.255 The court noted, “If computer service
providers were subject to [liability upon notification], they would
face potential liability each time they receive notice of a
potentially defamatory statement . . . .”256 The court continued to
explain that this causes a “careful yet rapid investigation of the
circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal
judgment concerning the information’s defamatory character, and
an on-the-spot editorial decision whether to risk liability by
allowing the continued publication of that information.”257 This
proposed amendment addresses these concerns in a variety of
ways. First, the service may avoid an evaluation of the legal
claim by contacting the poster and receiving permission to
remove the material. If this proves ineffective, the service must
address the legal claim, but it does so through its designated
agent. The amendment provides a reasonable period of time (to
voyeurism, New Jersey noted that “people have a right to control the
observation of their most intimate behavior under circumstances where a
reasonable person would not expect to be observed.” S. Comm. State., S.B. 2366,
210th Leg., at 1 (N.J. 2013).
255. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997)
(explaining the problems of imposing liability upon notification, or “distributor
liability”).
256. Id.
257. Id.
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be determined by the legislature) to allow for evaluation of the
claim and response by the service. While services face “potential
liability each time they receive notice,” they are faced with a
variety of options to address these notifications and respond to
the complainant without losing their § 230 immunity.
Furthermore, this amendment encourages interactive
computer services to take action against unlawful activity, which
supports Congress’s primary goal of “targeting indecency on the
Internet and encouraging ISPs to block and filter objectionable
material.”258 Current interpretations of § 230 immunity provide
no such incentive for self-regulation.259 Rather, ISPs and website
operators receive immunity regardless of whether they act upon
notification and may simply ignore victims’ pleas to remove
actionable material.260 This allows tortious and harmful material
to thrive on these sites. This amendment would require ISPs and
website operators to act upon notification, and the threat of civil
liability would encourage the computer services to thoughtfully
consider the notification and remove the objectionable
materials.261
VI. Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit once asked, “Why should a law designed
to eliminate ISPs’ liability to the creators of offensive material
end up defeating claims by the victims of tortious criminal
conduct?”262 Though the court ultimately followed the traditional
258. See Duran, supra note 169, at 125 (explaining that the CDA “has
worked against [Congress’s] primary goal of targeting indecency on the Internet
and encouraging ISPs to block and filter objectionable materials”).
259. See, e.g., id. (providing examples of courts’ refusal to impose liability on
computer services even after the service fails to act after receiving notification of
harmful material). For example, in Doe v. GTE Corp., ISP personnel may have
been aware of obscene images of college athletes recorded by a hidden camera,
but the lawsuit was dismissed. Doe v. GTE Corp. 347 F.3d 655, 662 (7th Cir.
2003).
260. See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (finding for defendant computer service
despite its failure to act upon notification of harmful material).
261. See Duran, supra note 169, at 124 (“The threat of lawsuits would force
an ISP to at least review complaints and respond to problems.”).
262. Doe, 347 F.3d at 660.
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broad interpretation of § 230 and granted immunity to the
defendant ISP in that case,263 it raised an important point: when
interactive computer services like websites and ISPs retain civil
immunity despite knowledge of unlawful conduct by third-party
posters, they allow harmful activities to flourish on the
Internet.264 This includes the distribution of nonconsensual
pornography, but also extends to cyberbullying, cyber
harassment, and cyber stalking as well.265 These activities
continue without much regulation by website operators or ISPs,
and victims find that their relief is barred by the broad
interpretations of § 230 immunity as well as by inadequate and
inefficient relief in other areas of law. This immunity leads to an
endless cycle of unfettered tortious activity on the web.
While some states seek criminal prosecution of posters to
combat nonconsensual pornography, an amendment to § 230
requiring action upon notification provides a more comprehensive
and effective remedy. Such an amendment not only provides
victims with the removal they seek, but it also incentivizes
regulation of tortious material, rather than supporting a
completely hands-off approach. This halts the cycle of online
tortious activity that affects the lives of so many and begins
instead a process of healing for victims of online abuse.

263. See id. at 662 (affirming the lower court’s dismissal of the case in favor
of the defendant computer service).
264. See Citron, supra note 62, at 119 (“[B]road immunity for operators of
abusive websites eliminates incentives for better behavior by those in the best
position to minimize harm.” (citation omitted)).
265. See id. at 68–84 (describing various incidents of online harassment and
abuse).

